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This paper develops a compact new open macroeconomics model of a Monetary Union to
evaluate, on the one hand, the consequences of the imperfect integration of the goods and
labour markets, when countries are hit by asymmetric shocks and, on the other hand, the
macroeconomic and welfare gains associated with a further integration of either market. First
we outline the stabilising nature of short run fixed wages since macroeconomic adjustment is
characterised by a lower volatility of the main aggregates. A greater integration of either
market smoothes macroeconomic adjustment, but does not necessarily lead to big gains in
terms of inflation differential reduction when wages are fixed in the short run. Second, when
wages are fixed, a greater integration of the goods market increases welfare dispersion while
an increase in labour market integration reduces per capita welfare dispersion in the union.
Thus  the  Mundellian  OCA  criterion  clearly  dominates  Mc  Kinnon’s.  Nevertheless,  the
optimality of the Mundellian criterion rests on the fact that wages are fixed in the short run
since wage flexibility, on the one hand, makes welfare dispersion unaffected by the relative
integration  of  either  market  when  the  monetary union is  affected  by  asymmetric  demand
shocks, and, on the other hand, the integration of the goods market is a key factor for reducing
welfare dispersion in the union following an asymmetric productivity shock.
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1 – Introduction
The creation of a single currency area requires some homogeneity in the economic structure
of the participating countries, since they can no longer rely on exchange rate management to
smooth the macroeconomic consequences of asymmetric national or regional shocks. The
analytical pillars for building monetary unions that were set in the early sixties by the theory
of Optimal Currency Areas (OCA) define homogeneity in terms of either labour or goods
market integration. As a by product of that time Keynesian economics these analyses assumed
short run rigid real wages and prices – thus requiring an adjustment in terms of quantity of
goods  and  labour  –  but  also  a  very  low  international  mobility  of  financial  assets.  These
seminal contributions have deeply influenced the way we think about the desirability of a
common currency, since, despite the increased European financial integration, they are still
regularly  invoked  as  key  criteria  to  ease  the  macroeconomic  adjustment  in  the  European
Monetary Union (Trichet, 2003).
Mundell (1961) firstly insisted on labour market integration. In a two country world - with
wage and price rigidities, as well as a low international capital mobility - a switch in demand
in favour of a country goods induces an excess demand for both goods and labour in this
nation, while the other country experiences both a reduction in activity and an increase in
unemployment. In this situation labour mobility dampens the costs of asymmetric shocks in a
monetary union, since the unemployed workers of the second country would find a job in the
first one, thus also solving the goods market problem of country 1. According to Mc Kinnon
(1963), the integration of the goods market would avoid the expenditure switching  outlined
by Mundell : when two countries trade intensively with each other the distinction between
domestic and foreign goods looses much of its significance, and most goods fetch the same
price once converted in the same currency; in this case, nominal exchange rate fails to affect
their real exchange rate, thus giving up the exchange rate as an adjustment variable entails no
serious loss of policy independence. In  this  situation  the  integration of  the  goods  market
constitutes the key element for building a currency union.
In practice, the European union has been built on the premises of goods market integration.
As outlined by Blanchard (2004), this is clearly a consequence of the Delors report which
offered a timetable to eliminate physical barriers. Although most of the institutional agenda3
set out in 1985 was achieved at the start of 1993,  the effective integration of the goods market
is  still  under  debate.  Among  others,  Chen  (2004)  finds  that  European  economies  display
significant goods market border features since Germany appears to trade about 2,5 more with
itself, Great Britain 3.2, France and Italy more than 7 times. Head and Mayer (2000) show
that, even if the degree of goods market segmentation has shrunk over the last decade, two
European regions trade in average 14 times more when they belong to the same country.
Furthermore, the smaller European economies display a lower degree of market integration.
Thus, the abolition of border controls on intra-EU trade, as well as the harmonisation or
mutual recognition of standards and other regulations, that were intended to increase intra-EU
competition and hence intra-EU trade did not lead to a full integrated goods market.
The increase of labour market integration is a much more critical question. First, the statistical
measurement  of  this  phenomenon  makes  problem  in  Europe,  since  there  is  no  clear
homogeneous definition of migration in the European countries (Wildasin, 2000). Second,
factors impeding labour mobility are related to national market regulations as well as factors
depending  on  language  or  cultural  barriers.  The  integration  of  this  market  may  be  much
longer than the reduction of barriers to trade. At a first glance, the European labour market is
clearly less integrated than the American one, as outlined by the greater dispersion of regional
unemployment rates in Europe. The interregional migration of labour between regions in the
EU is much lower than it is in the United states (Gros, 2003), and it is difficult to determine
which  part  of  labour  migration  can  be  considered  as  an  adjustment  mechanism  to
asymmetrical shocks. As reported by Blanchard and Katz (1992), labour migration is a key
equilibrating factor in the United states since they find that a on percent shock to employment
in a given state is followed by a 0.3 percent increase in unemployment , a 0.05 % decrease in
labour force participation, migration - as a residual - accounting for 0.65 %. Furthermore, the
Results  reported  by  Decressin  and  Fatas  (1995),  show  that  in  Europe,  most  of  an
asymmetrical shock is absorbed by changes in the participation rate while, in the US, it is
immediately reflected in migration.
Since the coherence of the Euro area regarding these two OCA criteria is an open question,
the analysis of the European monetary union as an imperfectly integrated economic area gains
some interest today. The current European situation raises a series of interesting analytical
questions : What are the consequences of an imperfect integration of both goods and labour
market with respect to the reference case of a perfectly integrated economic area, in terms of4
macroeconomic volatility and in terms of welfare ? Since Goods market Integration is clearly
much higher than labour market integration, are the marginal gains associated to a further
labour market integration sizeable ? More generally, with regards to welfare is there a clear
hierarchy  between the two original criteria of Mundell and Mc Kinnon ?
To answer these questions, this paper develops a compact new open macroeconomics model
of  a  monetary  union.  The  objective  is  to  evaluate,  on  the  one  hand,  the  macroeconomic
consequences of the imperfect integration of the goods and labour markets, when countries
are hit by asymmetric shocks and, on the other hand, the welfare gains associated with a
further integration of either market. The paper is organised as follows : paragraph 2 outlines a
two  country  world  that  forms  the  basis  of  the  analysis;  paragraph  3  analyses  the
macroeconomic adjustment in the monetary union in the case of flexible wages depending on
the relative integration of either markets; paragraph 4 evaluates the macroeconomic costs
associated to an imperfect integration of the markets when wages are fixed in the short run;
paragraph 5 concentrates on welfare issues to rank OCA criteria; paragraph 6 concludes .
2. A Two Country World
The model describes a two country world that forms a Monetary Union. Each nation  { } 2 , 1 = n
represents  half  of  the  Union.  It  is  populated  byN consumers  and  by  a  single  firm  that
produces  a  national  final  good.  There  are  three  types  of  exchanges  between  the  two
economies  :  final  goods,  labour  force  and  a  one  period  composite  bond.  The  imperfect
integration  of  the  goods  and  the  labour  market  are  treated  in  a  simple  symmetrical  way
through their consequences, by imposing home bias on final consumption and on labour input
use in national production functions. Segmentation and full integration of either markets will
be considered as limiting cases for the relevant bias parameter.
2.1 Households
In each economy  { } 2 , 1 = n  The number  N  of consumers is normalised to one. The immortal
representative  Household  iof  country  n  has  preferences  over  a  consumption  aggregate
) (i C
n
s and  supplies  monopolistically  its  own  type  of  labour  in  quantity  ) (i L
n
s ,  so  that  it
maximises a welfare index 
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where,  [ )   , for ∞ ∈ t s , 
n
s P  is the consumer price index in country n,  ) (i B
n
s ( ) ( 1 i B
n
s+ ) are the
holdings of the composite one period real bond by the 
th i agent of country  nat the end of
period  s( 1 + s ) that pays a gross real rate of interest of  s R between periods  ) 1 ( − s and  s and
) (i W
n
s   is  the  nominal  wage  corresponding  to  type  ilabour  in  the 
th n country.  Finally,
n
s u n
s e U U 0 = ,  0 U and  0 Z  are exogenous utility parameters, and 
n
s u  is a white noise shock to
preferences regarding aggregate consumption.
The solution to this problem satisfies two first order conditions which insure both the internal
and external equilibria of the 
th n economy in period  t. Therefore, we are provided with a
consumption based bond Euler equation and a wage setting equation for each differentiated
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where φ  is a parameter reflecting the elasticity of substitution of between the different types
of labour in the production process of each firm. The aggregate consumption level of the
representative household of the 
th n economy,  ) (i C
n
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where  ) ( 1 i C
n
s  ( ) ( 2 i C
n
s ) denotes its consumption of country 1 (country 2) goods. The consumer
price index in the 
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where,  s P 1 ( s P2 ) denotes the price of the good produced in country 1 (country 2). In this
framework, the imperfect integration of the goods market is simply modelled as a home bias
in favour of national goods in the consumption bundle of the representative household. To
make the model tractable, we impose that  1 2 1 = +γ γ  at the international level. In this case, a
bias in favour of national good in country 1 simply requires that 5 . 0 1 > = γ γ  , while, as a
mirror image, the relative weight devoted to the consumption of country 2 good in country 2
consumption is equal to  5 . 0 ) 1 ( 1 2 > = = − γ γ γ . In this perspective, full integration and full
segmentation of the goods market are thus limiting cases, requiring respectively symmetry in
consumption practises (i.e.,  5 . 0 2 1 = = γ γ ) or total specialisation in tastes (i.e.  1 2 1 = = γ γ ).
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with,  γ γ = 1  and  ( ) γ γ − = 1 2
2.2 Firms
There is a single firm in each country n that combines labour inputs to produce a national
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where,  ) (
1 i Lns ( ) (
2 i Lns ), features country n demand for type i labour supplied in country 1
(country 2). Symmetrically to  n γ  on the goods market, the parameter  n ρ  in (2.7) features the
degree of labour segmentation in the Monetary Union. Treating the composite labour 
n
t L
according  to  the  consumption  index  ) (i C
n
t ,  n ρ   is  such  that  1 2 1 = + ρ ρ ,  thus  implying
ρ ρ = 1   and  ρ ρ − =1 2 .  As  a  consequence,  full  segmentation  (integration)  of  the  labour
market requires  1 = ρ  ( 5 . 0 = ρ ).
The efficiency condition on either national input is defined according to,
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while the no entry condition on the goods market requires that the selling price of the good
produced in the 
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2.3 General Equilibrium Conditions
The general equilibrium of the model is defined according to two sets of equations. The
Intratemporal condition is given by the goods and labour market clearing conditions, which
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while the financial market equilibrates current account deficits, a country accumulating claims
on the other member to finance a goods transaction deficit/surplus. Thus, the inter-temporal
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In the paper we solve the model (2.1)-(2.12) in log-deviation to evaluate the effect of a greater
integration of either Goods or Labour market in terms of macroeconomic volatility and in
terms of welfare.
2.4 The Model in Log-deviation
The symmetric steady state is characterised by  0 C C
n
t =  for n={1,2} for all t ≤ 0. From the
Euler consumption equation  δ = −1 1 R , from the balance of payment relation, 0 0 =
n B , which
in turn implies that  0 0 Y C = . On the other hand, combining the F.O.C. on labour supply, and
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− − − = Z L φ φ .  Finally,  normalising  1 0 0 = =
n
n P P   we  get




O = = .9
Applying the standard rules of log linearisation in the neighbourhood of this steady steady-
state we can write the model according to equations (2.13)-(2.38). Pair expressions are related
to the Domestic economy and impair relations to the Foreign country. Equations (2.13)-(2.24)
describe the demand side of the model ((2.13) and (2.14) the log linear expression of the Euler
Relation, (2.15) and (2.16) the decomposition of the national consumption index given the
mirror  image  assumption,  (2.17)-(2.20)  the  individual  demand  functions  related  to  the
domestic and the foreign goods, (2.21) and (2.22) the national price levels, (2.23) and (2.24)
the current account). Equations (2.25) and (2.38) describe the supply side of the model ((2.25)
and (2.27) labour supply, (2.28)-(2.29) labour demand addressed to domestic and foreign
country labour force, (2.31) and (2.32) the production function, (2.33) and (2.34) the no entry
condition, (2.35) and (2.36) the labour force employed in the economy and (2.37) and (2.38)



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 3. Market Integration and Macroeconomic Volatility with Flexible Wages
This paragraph evaluates the impact of goods and labour market integration on the relative
adjustment  of  national  aggregates  in  the  Monetary  Union  for  the  constrained  optimal
equilibrium. We first develop a simple solution procedure to compute the reduced form of the
model, then we evaluate the sensitivity of aggregate volatility to the integration of markets
following demand and productivity shocks.
3.1 The IE-EE solution procedure
We adapt the “GG-MM” method introduced by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and extended to
alternative  new  open  macroeconomics  settings  by  Hau  (2000)  and  Warnock  (2003)  to
equations  (2.13)  –  (2.38),  so  that  the  model  can  be  summarised  according  to  two  main
schedules.  First,  the  EE  relation  describes  the  external  equilibrium  of  the  countries
participating to the Monetary Union as the intertemporal  equilibrium of their current account.
Subtracting (2.24) from (2.23), taking into account the financial market equilibrium and the
fact that the deviation of the difference in the rate of per capita consumption follows a random
walk, (i.e. that the deterministic component of the deviation of per capita consumption rates
are permanent
1, so that 
1 1
1 s s b b = +  for  t s > ),  combining the expression thus obtained with
equations (2.13)-(2.22) we obtain the EE schedule as the first relation in (3.1). Second, the IE
schedule  defines  the  relative  internal  equilibrium  of  the  participating  countries  as  the
determination of relative output. Since wages are flexible, output is supplied determined and
the internal equilibrium of the participating countries takes into account the equilibrium of the
labour market. Combining (2.25) – (2.26) with (2.33) – (2.26) and rearranging by taking into
account (2.21) – (2.22),  the IE schedule is defined according to the second relation in (3.1),
( ) ( )
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1  this simplifies the model dynamics by assuming that the new steady state that is reached at
the end of  t s =  is maintained for  [ ) ∞ ∈ , t s  as outlined by Obsfeld and Rogoff (1995).12
(3.1)
As shown in (3.1), The External Equilibrium of the countries in the monetary union requires a
negative relation between consumption growth differential  ( )
2 1
t t c c −  and domestic terms of
trade ( ) t t p p 2 1 − . This must be understood as follows : an increase in the relative price of the
country 1 good decreases its demand in both economies with respect to that of country 2
good. Consumption home bias  ( ) 5 . 0 > γ  implies a relatively higher reduction of domestic
consumption, thus explaining the negative link between the two aggregates. It shall be noted
that, an increase in the integration of the goods market (i.e., a decrease of γ ) dampens this
effect  since  it  increases  final  consumption  bundles  homogeneity.  The  relative  internal
equilibrium of the economies requires a positive relation between  ( ) t t p p 2 1 −  and  ( )
2 1
t t c c −
for a given difference in output growth. This must be understood as follows : an increase in
consumption  growth  rate  differential  implies  a  net  increase  in  the  domestic  wage  which
depresses labour demand and activity. To maintain output growth differential, this requires a
net  increase  of  the  relative  price  of  the  domestic  final  good  so  as  to  keep  real  wages
unchanged. Labour market integration (i.e., a decrease of  ρ ) reduces the sensitivity of terms
of trade increase to consumption growth differential since the domestic firm can substitute
foreign labour for domestic labour, thus putting less weight on the goods selling price.
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to define the reduced form of the aggregates according to,
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with  ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 1 2 1 2 1 1 − − − + = Φ γ ρ δ .
Equations (3.3)-(3.9) are simulated in figures 2 and 3 to characterise the constrained optimal
macroeconomic adjustment of the monetary union when it is affected by asymmetric demand
or supply shocks.
3.2 Shocks and Macroeconomic Adjustment
The EE-IE solution procedure offers a very simple tool to document the general equilibrium
consequences of shocks. The EE-IE system defined by (3.1) is presented in Figure 1 in the
consumption growth differential / terms of trade increase space. At point A, (EE1-IE1 are
such that  ( ) ( ) 0
2 1 2 1 = − = − t t t t a a u u ) the Monetary Union lies on the initial symmetric steady
state defined in 2.4. An asymmetric positive home demand shock (( ) 0
2 1 > − t t u u ) moves the
EE schedule rightwards to EE2, so that the new short run equilibrium B is characterised by an
increase  of  both  relative  aggregate  home  consumption  and  the  terms  of  trade.  Figure  2
documents the impact of this shock on the main aggregates. We more particularly concentrate
on  values  of  [ ] 8 . 0 , 95 . 0 ∈ γ   which  implies  a  relative  preference  towards  national  goods
representing from nineteen to four times the consumption of the imported good. Curves are
drawn  for  a  given  value  of  ρ   (the  thickest  curve  represents  the  autarkic  labour  market14
situation,  1 = ρ ,  the  dotted  curve  stands  for  the  perfect  mobility  situation,  5 . 0 = ρ ,  the
intermediate curve for a very low value of labour force mobility  98 . 0 = ρ ).
INSERT HERE FIGURES 1 AND 2
Assuming  an  autarkic  labour  market  a  positive  aggregate  demand  in  the  home  country
increases nominal wages, thus reducing labour demand and activity with respect to the foreign
country an increase in the home final good relative price to balance the labour market. Goods
market developments can be analysed as follows : Part of the increase in consumption is met
through a deficit of the current account – in the intertemporal approach tradition. Finally,
given home bias in consumption, the domestic price index is relatively more affected by the
terms  of  trade  increase,  thus  inducing  a  clear  inflation  differential  between  the  member
countries of the union. An increase in goods market integration  smoothes the macroeconomic
adjustment in the monetary union since, for a stable relative aggregate consumption growth
differential,  it  dampens  the  relative  deviation  of  participating  countries  aggregates.  An
increase in labour mobility also dampens aggregate fluctuations : the possibility of labour
substitution induces a net labour force inflow in the domestic economy; this, in turn, limits
both national relative wage inflation and output reduction with respect to the other economy.
In the extreme case of perfect labour integration, there is no term of trade adjustment in the
union : indeed, perfect substitution between domestic and foreign labour make relative wages
adjustment redundant in the union thus putting no weight on individual price adjustment to
adjust  the  labour  market  in  terms  of  real  wages.  Consequently,  there  is  no  longer  any
deviation in employment (and in labour force inflow) nor in activity, and inflation differential
vanishes.
INSERT HERE FIGURE 3
An  asymmetric  positive  home  supply  shock  (i.e.,  ( ) 0
2 1 > − t t a a )moves  the  IE  schedule
rightwards to IE2, so that the new short run equilibrium C is characterised by an increase in
the  relative  aggregate  home  consumption  and  a  reduction  in  the  terms  of  trade.  Now,  a15
positive domestic productivity shock reduces the relative price of the domestic goods and
leads to both an increase in activity and in labour demand in the domestic economy. When
labour force is mobile, this generates labour inflow. Due to terms of trade reduction, the
goods market adjustment is characterised by a relative decrease in the domestic consumption
price index and a small increase in domestic consumption, as long as it exhibits a clear home
bias. The reduction of the terms of trade increases the relative demand for the domestic good
in the foreign economy thus inducing a positive home current account surplus. As noted
previously goods market and labour market integration dampen aggregate relative volatility.
In  the  extreme  case  where  labour  is  perfectly  mobile,  half  of  the  domestic  employment
increase is met by labour inflow.
The features characterising the adjustment of the monetary union in a flexible wage setting
will serve below as a benchmark for assessing the consequences of short run wage rigidity on
the intertemporal general equilibrium.
4  Market Integration and Macroeconomic Volatility with Short Run Fixed Wages
This paragraph evaluates how short run wage rigidity affects macroeconomic adjustment in
the monetary union. The consequences of wage rigidity are firstly assessed on the definition
of  the  internal  equilibrium  of  the  Monetary  Union  participants;  then  we  simulate  the
consequences of an asymmetric demand shock on the main aggregates.
4.1 The IE-EE solution procedure with short run fixed wages
Short run wage rigidity affects the IE schedule. Given monopolistic competition in the labour
market and fixed wages, the economy now operates under its optimal constrained production
possibility frontier and output is demand determined. The relative internal equilibrium of the
Monetary Union participants does no longer take into account labour market equilibrium,
since employment depends on the goods market equilibrium. Combining individual goods
schedules with the relative equilibrium conditions and taking into account the fact that the
link between consumption and output deviations are home biased , we now write the EE-IE
system according to,16
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(4.1)
The  relative  internal  equilibrium  of  countries  now  requires  a  negative  link  between  the
domestic  terms  of  trade  increase  and  consumption  growth  differential.  Indeed,  output
differences are determined by consumption differences which in turns are negatively affected
by the relative price of individual goods. An increase in the integration of the goods market
dampens  the  impact  of  terms  of  trade  on  consumption  bundles,  as  they  become  more
homogenous. Thus, as shown in Figure 1, the IE3 schedule is negatively slopped and becomes
flatter as goods market integration increases. Since terms of trade variation now reflect goods
market adjustment, they are no longer determined by the labour market adjustment as it was
the case for the optimal constrained equilibrium.
Combining the solution of (4.1) with (3.2), we can write the reduced form of the model with
short run fixed wages according to,
( )( ) ( )
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4.2 The Consequences of a Demand shock
The consequences of an asymmetric one percent home demand shock are presented in figure
1. EE moves rightwards to EE2 along IE3. The new short run equilibrium D is characterised
by  a  relative  domestic  consumption  growth  and  a  reduction  in  the  terms  of  trade.  The
adjustment  of  (4.2)-(4.8)  is  simulated  in  figure  4.  Since  the  economy  operates  under  its
production  possibility  frontier,  a  positive  demand  shock  now  increases  relative  domestic
activity, reduces involuntary unemployment and increases consumption (thus imports, as part
of it falls on foreign goods). The integration of the goods market increases demand for the
home goods, which leads to a further decrease of the relative domestic good price thus an
increase of its relative demand, which finally transfers into an increase of the output growth
differential. As consumption bundles become more homogeneous, the inflation differential
diminishes. An increase in labour mobility has little effect on output differential and on terms
of trade adjustment; it mainly affects inflation differential and labour inflow, since, as in the
optimal constrained equilibrium situation half of the relative employment increase is filled by
labour force inflow.
INSERT HERE FIGURES 4 AND 5
Finally, figure 5 compares the actual and the optimal constrained short run adjustments for a
very  limited  degree  of  labour  force  mobility  ( 98 . 0 = ρ ).  Although  consumption  growth
differential appear comparable, the current account deficit is limited in the fixed wage case,
since the reduction of the relative price of the domestic good increases exports towards the
foreign country. One shall also outline the different adjustment path of the various variables
and the fact that flexible wages in the short run introduce more volatility in the short run in
the monetary union. The following section evaluates the consequences of these dissimilarities
in terms of per capita welfare for the participating countries.18
5.  Asymmetric Shocks and Welfare Dispersion in a Monetary Union
This last section investigates the welfare consequences of an imperfect integration of the
labour and goods market when the monetary union is affected by asymmetric shocks. We first
define the log deviation of per capita national welfare, then we assess the effect of short run
wage rigidity with respect to the benchmark optimal constrained equilibrium
5.1 Asymmetric Shocks and Welfare Transfers
Independently of the nationality of the representative agent, the expression of the welfare
function (2.1) in the symmetric steady state is 
δ
δ δ ) 1 ( )) ln 1 ( 1 ( 0 0 0
0
+ − + +
= Ω
Z C U n , so that
the deviation of  country n welfare in period t with respect to  n





























t l E l Z c E c U u C U
δ δ
ω . (5.1)
Applying  Aoki’s  method,  we  can  define  national  per  capita  welfare  deviation  as  a
combination  of  both  the  average  union  per  capita  welfare  increase  and  of  the  per  capita
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average  union  demand  and  supply  shock,  we  get,  independently  of  wage  flexibility  and
market integration,
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As a consequence, the impact of market integration on welfare in the monetary union can
simply be evaluated on the basis of the welfare transfer between the participating countries.19
For the optimal constrained equilibrium of the monetary union, combining (5.1) with (3.2),
we can write for  ] [ 5 . 0 , 1 ∈ γ ,
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t t c c −  and ( ) t t p p 2 1 −  respectively given by (3.5) and (3.6).
Under short run fixed wages, since employment depends on relative final goods demand, the
welfare transfer is defined for  ] [ 5 . 0 , 1 ∈ γ  according to,
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t t c c −  given by (4.3).
5.2 Wage rigidity and the ranking of OCA criteria
Since  the  per  capita  union  level  consequences  of  shocks  are  identical  independently  of
market  integration  or  wage  rigidity,  welfare  issues  relating  to  the  impact  of  asymmetric
shocks must be assessed on the basis of national per capita welfare dispersion with respect to
the union level per capita average. In what follows we evaluate this phenomenon according to
the following function,20




t t t ω ω ω ω − − = Ψ , (5.8)




t t t ω ω − = Ψ (5.9)
This expression is simulated for  ] [ 5 . 0 , 1 ∈ γ  and  [ ] 5 . 0 , 1 ∈ ρ  in tables 1, 2 and 3.
INSERT HERE TABLES 1 AND 2
Table 1 reports welfare dispersion between union members following an asymmetric one
percent demand shock, depending upon both the integration of the goods market (measured in
columns) and the integration of the labour market (lines). Ceteris paribus, a greater integration
of  the  goods  market  increases  welfare  dispersion  while  an  increase  in  labour  market
integration reduces per capita welfare dispersion in the union. Thus the Mundellian OCA
criterion clearly dominates Mc Kinnon criterion in terms of welfare. Indeed, assuming no
labour mobility, an asymmetric demand shock affects both welfare levels, since with fixed
wages this decreases the relative price of the domestic good which in turn improves both
welfare in the union. Nevertheless, the productive weight of this supplementary goods are all
carried by the domestic economy, which ceteris paribus decreases home welfare. Thus, as
goods market integration increases, so does welfare dispersion in the monetary union. The
reduction of welfare dispersion comes from a greater integration of the labour market, as this
induces a better sharing of the labour effort needed to produce the supplementary goods in the
short run fixed situation.
As outlined by table 2, the optimality of the Mundellian criterion depends on the fact that
wages  are  fixed  in  the  short  run.  Indeed,  the  flexibility  of  the  wages  has  two  main
consequences in this setting : first, welfare dispersion is unaffected by the relative integration
of either market; second the optimal constrained welfare dispersion is higher for relatively
low integration level of either market (the welfare dispersion of the short run fixed wage
situation is greater only for very low of the labour market integration and a high integration of
the goods market). This feature can be linked to the highest volatility of aggregates noted in
the flexible case.21
INSERT HERE TABLE 3
Nevertheless, flexible wages do not insure the neutrality of market integration in a monetary
union since, as reported in Table 3, the integration of the goods market appears as a key factor
for reducing welfare dispersion in the union following an asymmetric productivity shock. In
this situation, indeed, an asymmetric supply shock reduces the relative price of the domestic
good which affects the relative demand of this good in the two countries. A greater integration
of the goods market thus allows a better sharing of the relevant welfare gains.
6.  Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to document in a new open economy macroeconomics framework
the consequences of imperfect goods and labour market integration in a monetary union,
when it is affected by asymmetric shocks. First, comparing different degrees of wage rigidity,
we found, for a comparable consumption growth differential, that the current account deficit
was  limited  in  the  fixed  wage  case,  since  the  reduction  of  the  domestic  terms  of  trade
increases exports towards the foreign country. More generally, we outline the destabilising
nature of flexible wages on macroeconomic adjustment since the macroeconomic adjustment
was characterised by a greater volatility of the main aggregates. Finally, a greater integration
of either market tends  to  smooth  the  macroeconomic  adjustment  in  the  Monetary  Union,
although the inflation differential gain may be small in the fixed wage situation.
Second, when wages are fixed in the short run, a greater integration of the goods market
increases welfare dispersion while an increase in labour market integration reduces per capita
welfare dispersion in the union. Thus the Mundellian OCA criterion clearly dominates Mc
Kinnon criterion. The reduction of welfare dispersion comes from a greater integration of the
labour market, as this induces a clear sharing of the labour effort needed to produce the
supplementary  goods  in  the  short  run  fixed  situation.  The  optimality  of  the  Mundellian
criterion depends on the fact that wages are fixed in the short run. On the one hand, we found
that wage flexibility makes welfare dispersion unaffected by the relative integration of either
market when the monetary union is affected by asymmetric demand shocks. Nevertheless, on22
the other hand, the integration of the goods market appears  as  a  key  factor  for  reducing
welfare dispersion in the union following an asymmetric productivity shock.
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flexible wages ; demand shock
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Figure 3 :
flexible wages ; supply shock
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Figure 4
fixed wages ; demand shock
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Figure 5
comparison flex/fixed wages for very low labour mobility
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